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We show by an example that Proposition 2 in “Topologies on types” by Dekel, Fu-
denberg, and Morris [Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 275–309] is not true.
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Inarecentpaper, Dekeletal.(2006)(hereafter, DFM)proposethestrategictopology,
which is deﬁned to be just strong enough to guarantee that the correspondence map-
ping types into "-interim-correlated-rationalizable actions is continuous. That is, two
types are close under the strategic topology if and only if they have similar "-interim-
correlated-rationalizableactionsineveryﬁnitegame. Theyshowthatthestrategictopol-
ogy is still weak enough that ﬁnite types are dense in the universal type space.
In contrast to the strategic topology, DFM consider also the uniform strategic topol-
ogy, which requires the degree of similarity of strategic behavior to be uniform over all
ﬁnite games. DFM use their Proposition 2 to argue that ﬁnite types are not dense un-
der the uniform strategic topology. In this note, we present a counterexample to show
that the direction of Proposition 2 that DFM use in their non-denseness argument is not
correct.1 We also ﬁll a gap in their proof of the other direction of Proposition 2.
In order to make our discussion self-contained, we brieﬂy deﬁne the following nota-
tion. ForanytopologicalspaceY, let(Y)bethespaceofBorelprobabilitymeasureson
Y endowed with the standard weak topology. Let Y 0 =  be the ﬁnite set of basic un-
certainty endowed with the discrete topology. For every k 1, let Y k =Y k 1 (Y k 1).
Let (T ,) be the resulting Mertens–Zamir universal type space, where T  1
k=0(Y k)
and  is the homeomorphism between T  (endowed with the product topology) and
(T ). For i = 1,2, let T 
i = T  and 
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1In Chen and Xiong (2008), we nonetheless conﬁrm their conclusion by explicitly constructing a type
that is not the limit of any sequence of ﬁnite types under the uniform strategic topology.
Copyright c  2008 Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial License 3.0. Available athttp://econtheory.org.284 Chen and Xiong Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Let G = (Ai,gi)i=1,2 be a ﬁnite game, where Ai is a ﬁnite set of actions and gi :
A1  A2   ! [ 1,1] is the payoff function for player i. For any "  0, DFM deﬁne
the "-interim-correlated-rationalizable set R(G,") to be the largest (with respect to set
inclusion) set in ((2Ai)T 
i )i=1,2 with the best reply property that for any i = 1,2, j = 3 i,
and ai 2Ri(ti,G,"), there exists  2(Aj T 
j ) such that









i,a j,)]d  " for all a0
i 2Ai.
For each ti 2T 
i , deﬁne hi(tijai,G)=minf" :ai 2Ri(ti,G,")g.
The purpose of DFM’s Proposition 2 is to establish the equivalence between the two
metrics dUS and d  on T 





















where Fk is the collection of bounded real-valued functions on T  that are measur-
able with respect to kth-order beliefs. In particular, they aim to show dUS convergence
implies d  convergence, so that an argument in Morris (2002) can be invoked to show
that ﬁnite types are not dense under dUS.
First, we present an example showing that dUS(t n,t) ! 0 does not necessarily im-
ply d (t n,t) ! 0. Let  = f0,1g. Consider a hierarchy t = (1,2,3...), where it
is common 1-belief that  = 0. Let t n = (n
1,n
2,n
3 ...) be a hierarchy under which
both players believe  = 0 with probability 1   1=n and it is common 1-belief that
both players believe  = 0 with probability 1 1=n. Hence, [t] = (0,t) and [t n] =
(1 1=n)(0,t n) +(1=n)(1,t n) (cf. Mertens and Zamir 1985). Now consider the measur-
able function f : () ! [0,1] such that f (1) = 1 if 1 = f=0g and f (1) = 0 oth-
erwise. Observe that f can be identiﬁed with a bounded function f  : T  ! [0,1]
by deﬁning f (,e 1,e 2,e 3,...) = f (e 1) for every (,e 1,e 2,e 3,...) in   T . Hence,
the value of f  depends only on () and f  is measurable with respect to (), i.e.,
f  2 F1. Observe that E(f j[t]) = 1 and E(f j[t n]) = 0 for every n. Therefore, 
E(f j[t]) E(f j[t n])

 = 1 and hence d (t n,t)  1 for every n. However, it is
straightforward to verify that the Prohorov metric between the kth-order beliefs of t n
and t equals 1=n for every n and k  1, which can be used to show that dUS(t n,t) ! 0.
(A detailed proof is provided in Chen and Xiong 2008.)
Second, DFM also show that d (ti,t 0
i) ! 0 implies dUS(ti,t 0
i) ! 0. They start with
two types ti and t 0
i with d (ti,t 0
i)  " and aim to show that Ri(ti,G,)  Ri(t 0
i,G,+4")
for any   0, which implies dUS(ti,t 0
i)  4". However, for ai 2 Ri(ti,G,), when DFM
choose a conjecture 0 to ( + 4")-rationalize ai for t 0
i, they do not explicitly check if
0[f(a j,,tj) : a j 2 Rj(tj,G,+4")g] = 1 is true. We propose one way to deal with thisTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) “Topologies on types”: Correction 285
issue. Suppose that ai 2 Ri(ti,G,) and  is a conjecture that -rationalizes ai. Since
Aj T 
j is a standard separable measure space, there exist conditional probabilities
(j,tj) 2 (Aj). Also, since tj 7! Rj(tj,G,+4") is upper hemicontinuous under the
product topology on T 
j , by the Kuratowski–Ryll–Nardzewski Theorem (see Aliprantis
andBorder1999), thereisameasurablefunctiond :T 
j !Aj withd(tj)2Rj(tj,G,+4")
for all tj 2 T 
j . Let S = f(,tj) : support[(j,tj)]  Rj(tj,G,)g. To deﬁne 0, we ﬁrst





d(tj) if (,tj) = 2S.
Then we deﬁne the conjecture 0 2 (Aj    T 
j ) such that for any measurable set
E  T 






j 0 = 
i[t 0
i]. Moreover, we have 0[f(a j,,tj) : a j 2 Rj(tj,G,+4")g] = 1,
because support[bj(,tj)]  Rj(tj,G,+4") for all tj 2 T 
j by the deﬁnitions of S and
d(). Then, we can use equation (8) in Dekel et al. (2006, p. 306) to verify that ai is a
(+4")-bestreplyto0. (AdetailedproofisprovidedinChenandXiong2008.) Therefore,
ai 2Ri(t 0
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